We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that all unanimous decision rules are not equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules, and (ii) ex-ante e¢ cient in a broad class of situations.
Introduction
In many sensitive situations, group decisions are required to be unanimous. For instance, many international organizations could not exist without granting some sort of veto power to their members. In such cases, the constraint stems from sovereignty and enforceability issues (Zamora 1980 Unanimous decision making can be seen as a means of ensuring that a reform will only be adopted if it constitutes a Pareto improvement over the status quo (Wicksell 1967 [1896]; Buchanan and Tullock 1962) . However, when information is incomplete, whether or not a reform is adopted also depends on how information is aggregated (Holmstrom and Myerson 1983) . The literature focuses on the so-called unanimity rule (henceforth Unanimity), which is commonly used in practice: agents either consent or dissent, and the reform is only adopted if everyone consents. Unfortunately, this rule features poor information aggregation properties (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998 ; Austen-Smith and
Banks 2006).
We argue that all unanimous decision rules are not equivalent. We show that k-Veto rules are (i) Pareto superior to Unanimity, and (ii) ex-ante e¢ cient in a broad class of situations. Under these rules, agents have three options -consent, dissent, or veto-and the reform is adopted if and only if (i) at least k agents consents, and (ii) there is no veto.
We refer to this rule as Veto when the quorum k corresponds to that of a simple majority.
Let us sketch the argument that underpins our main results using a simple example.
There are three agents who have to vote on whether to adopt a given reform or keep the status quo. The agents either have private or common value, and this is private information. Private-value agents always prefer the status quo. Common-value agents' prior is that the reform can be good or bad with equal probabilities, and they equally dislike a mistake in either direction. Before the vote, each agent receives a private binary signal regarding the merits of the reform. With probability 2 3 ; the signal is correct: it is positive if the reform is good, and negative if the reform is bad. As a result, the right decision for common-value agents is to adopt the reform if and only if there are at least two positive signals.
Under any unanimous rule, it is a weakly dominant strategy for private-value agents to veto the reform. Therefore, in their presence, the status quo remains, irrespective of common-value agents'behavior. This has two implications. First, common-value agents behave as if there were no private-value agents. Second, unanimous rules' performances can only di¤er when all agents have common value. Thus, information aggregation is the relevant dimension for welfare comparisons.
Under Unanimity, common-value agents with a bad signal are reluctant to veto the reform because they are pivotal only if the two other agents consent (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998). In equilibrium, when there are no private-value agents, common-value agents make the right decision about 88% of the time.
Under Veto, however, it is possible to reveal a negative signal without pinning down the outcome. This is what happens in an equilibrium: common-value agents with positive signals consent, and those with negative signals dissent. When there are no private-value agents, common-value agents always make the right decision.
Therefore, Veto Pareto dominates Unanimity in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) -both ex-ante and interim. That is, whatever their type and signals, all agents (weakly) prefer to use Veto over Unanimity. 1 When common-value agents have identical preferences (i.e., homogenous thresholds of reasonable doubt), this result analytically extends to any precision of (possibly biased) signals and any group size. But such a stylized structure of preference is not essential.
Indeed, Veto interim Pareto dominates Unanimity in cases where common-value agents may disagree ex post (i.e., they have heterogeneous thresholds of reasonable doubt).
In our example above, Veto is ex-post e¢ cient. Provided that common-value agents have homogenous thresholds, this property generalizes as follows: in all cases, there exists a k-Veto rule that enables common-value agents to always make the right decision. When they may disagree ex post, the concept of "right decision"is ambiguous. Ex-ante e¢ ciency is then the appropriate benchmark (Holmstrom and Myerson 1983) . Relying on a series of numerical examples and asymptotic results, we show that Veto is ex-ante e¢ cient in a broad set of situations.
To delimit the applicability of our analysis, it is useful to think in terms of social choice axioms (May 1952) . When decisions are required to be unanimous, there is an inevitable tension between neutrality (alternatives are treated equally) and completeness (a decision is taken in all cases). We study situations in which a unanimous decision is required to change a well-de…ned status quo; thus, we give precedence to completeness over neutrality. As a result, our analysis is not relevant to cases such as elections, where neutrality is considered essential (Dasgupta and Maskin 2008) .
In real-life situations, the key elements that make our analysis relevant are: (i) a common-value dimension; (ii) a unanimity requirement; (iii) limits to timely and truthful pre-vote communication. In Section 6, we argue that international organizations are a case in point. We discuss the case of the United Nations Security Council, which illustrates well the reasons for the use of k-Veto rules in the real world and why they have replaced Unanimity in some cases. Finally, there is a vast literature that views trials by jury as an information aggregation problem where the voting system plays a crucial role. Our analysis applies to such trials if, following this literature, we treat a hung jury as an absence of conviction. One of the main debates focuses on whether to use Unanimity or some form of majority rule. Because Veto combine the strengths of both Unanimity and majority rule, our results may bring the two sides of the debate closer together.
Related Literature. A key idea of this paper is that, compared to Unanimity, Veto enriches the strategic environment so that veto power can be granted without sacri…cing information aggregation. This contrasts with an earlier literature that suggests that these two dimensions are in con ‡ict. Speci…cally, the information aggregation literature shows that the implementation of simple voting rules designed to protect minority rights may lead to poor information aggregation and, somewhat paradoxically, may accomplish neither of the two goals (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998) .
Later studies have, however, identi…ed cases where these goals are not incompatible.
First, Coughlan (2001) shows that Unanimity aggregates information well in two variations of Feddersen and Pesendorfer's model. In the …rst, the unanimity requirement is twosided, but costless mistrials are allowed. Full information aggregation is feasible, but it may require agents to vote again and again on the same reform proposal until it is accepted or rejected unanimously. In the second, he considers pre-vote communication.
Full information aggregation requires that agents have very similar preferences. In a related paper, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) show that, in setups where preferences are uncertain, truthful revelation of private information is particularly problematic when agents have veto power. Second, Maug and Yilmaz (2002) show that, when preferences are common knowledge, requiring a majority within all (adequately designed) subgroups of an electorate can achieve information aggregation while protecting minority rights.
Broadly speaking, our paper relates to three strands of the literature. 
The Model
A group of n 3 agents (with n odd) must choose between two alternatives, the status quo Q and the reform R. 2 Information structure. There are two states of nature, ! 2 f! Q ; ! R g, which materialize with equal probability. The actual state of nature is not observable, but each agent privately observes an imperfectly informative signal. Conditional on the state of nature, the signals are independently drawn. There are two possible signals: s Q and s R . The probability of an agent observing signal s Q is higher in state ! Q than in state ! R ; and the converse is true for s R :
This assumption is made without loss of generality. In particular, it allows for cases in which observing one signal is more likely than the other in both states -e.g., Pr(s Q j! R ) > Pr(s R j! R ). In a slight abuse of notation, we denote by s i the signal received by agent i:
Preferences. Agents may have common value or private value. Common-value agents all prefer decision Q in state ! Q and decision R in state ! R . However, common-value agents may di¤er in their disutility from wrong decisions. We capture this with the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
State of the world
where c i 2 (0; 1). In this representation, c i and (1 c i ) are the respective weight that common-value agent i attaches to errors of type I (adopting a bad reform) and type II (not adopting a good reform). Therefore, c i can be interpreted as a measure of her cautiousness or, in a jury context, her threshold of reasonable doubt. In the baseline model (Sections 3 and 4), we focus on the case with homogenous cautiousness, where c i is the same for all common-value agents. In an extension (Section 5.1) we study the more 2 That n is odd only simpli…es the exposition.
general heterogeneous cautiousness cases, where c i 2 (0; 1) may vary across common-value agents. Private-value agents prefer the status quo Q, irrespective of the state of nature.
Each agent faces an ex-ante probability p i 2 [0; 1) of being a private-value agent, and a probability 1 p i of being a common-value one. We denote the corresponding vector by p (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ).
Types. We denote the (realized) type of agent i by i , where i = P for private-value agents and i = (s i ; c i ) for common-value agents. Thus, the set of possible types is P [ fs Q ; s R g (0; 1): We denote by ( 1 ; 2 ; :::; n ) 2 n the vector of realized type pro…les in the group.
Mechanisms (or decision rules).
We denote by M a mechanism that maps a type pro…le into a group decision (this can be a probabilistic mapping):
Voting systems. A voting system is a set of possible actions A and an aggregation rule d mapping agents' actions into a group decision: d : a 2 A n ! fQ; Rg.
The mapping implied by a voting system and an associated equilibrium strategy pro…le constitutes a mechanism.
The following voting systems are central to our analysis.
De…nition 1 De…nition 1. For each k = 1; 2; :::; n 1, voting system "k-Veto"is de…ned by: V k A k ; d k , where:
where X a denotes the total number of agents playing action a.
Since a single v su¢ ces to enforce the status quo Q, it can be interpreted as a veto exercised against the reform R. Accordingly, r and q can be interpreted as votes for and against the reform. The aggregation rule stipulates that the reform is implemented if, and only if, there is no veto and there are at least k votes in favor of R. As such, k can be interpreted as an approval quorum.
De…nition 2 De…nition 2. Voting system "Unanimity" is de…ned by:
where:
Our de…nition of Unanimity corresponds to the standard in the literature (see, e.g., Remark 1 Remark 1. Unanimity is strategically equivalent to a rule often called Consensus. Under Consensus, the reform is adopted if no agent opposes it. Formally, Consensus can be de…ned by action set fq; vg, and the same decision rule as under Unanimity.
Here, q denotes "silent consent".
Strategy and equilibrium concept. Following the literature (e.g., Feddersen and
Pesendorfer 1998), we focus on responsive symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. An agent's strategy is thus a function : ! 4 A . In particular, a ( ) denotes the probability with which an agent of type votes a. A responsive pro…le is such that (i) at least some types play action r with positive probability, and (ii) not all of them play r with probability 1. This ensures that, in equilibrium, some pivot probabilities are strictly positive -i.e., agents a¤ect the outcome of the vote with positive probability. Given that the reform R is implemented with positive probability for any responsive strategy pro…le, private-value agents always strictly prefer to vote against R. Thus, they always use their veto under any unanimous rule. Henceforth, we simply refer to responsive symmetric equilibria as equilibria.
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we present the main equilibrium results and provide intuition that will be useful to understand the welfare results.
Any equilibrium under k-Veto satis…es two conditions: condition their behavior on i 6 = P 8i: Therefore, we have that (1) the strategy pro…le played by common-value agents in any equilibrium under k-Veto must form an equilibrium when p = 0:
(2) if is an equilibrium strategy pro…le of the game when p = 0, it must also be an optimal strategy pro…le for common-value agents 8p 6 = 0.
Based on this result, we focus on the pure common-value game (p = 0) to describe the behavior of common-value agents.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that c i is identical for all common-value agents. For simplicity, we set c i = 1 2 . 3 At this point it is useful to introduce new pieces of notation. First, we denote the (relative) precision, or likelihood ratio, of signal s Q by
. Second, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote by R ( Q ) the type of a common-value agent who receives signal s R (s Q ).
The following Lemma extends Austen-Smith and Banks'(1996) result on informative voting under k-majority rules to our k-Veto system. Lemma 1 Lemma 1. For each tuple Q ; R ; n; p ; there is a k such that k-Veto admits an equilibrium in which: (i) R -agents play r; (ii) Q -agents play q if Q < ( R ) n 1 , and v otherwise.
3 Given that we consider all possible signal precision, this assumption is without loss of generality.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
We now describe equilibrium behavior in greater detail for Veto.
Lemma 2 Lemma 2. Under Veto, the pure common-value game admits at most two equilibria.
Proof. The full characterization of the set of equilibria and the proofs are in Appendix A1.
We now discuss these equilibria in turn.
The Information-Aggregation Equilibrium. In the …rst and most interesting equilibrium, agent behavior is easily understood through a series of simple examples.
First, assume that signal precision is symmetric. That is, R = Q . In this case, R -agents simply play r and Q -agents play q. This is because both signals have the same information content and the aggregation rule gives the same weight to r and q votes.
If signal precision is su¢ ciently asymmetric, agents "compensate" -i.e., agents with the less informative signal mix between r and q. We see the Unanimity-like equilibrium as a less credible predictor of agent behavior than the information aggregation equilibrium (see the discussion in Appendix A1 and Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, Malherbe 2016). If agents play the former, outcomes are simply equivalent under Veto and Unanimity, and the two systems feature identical welfare properties. This is why the welfare analysis focuses on the information aggregation equilibrium.
Welfare Analysis
In this section, we study the welfare properties of k-Veto based on the equilibrium analysis above (that is, when common-value agents have homogenous cautiousness: c i = 1 2 ). We …rst establish that Veto interim dominates Unanimity. We then show that (i) Veto is ex-ante e¢ cient when agents play pure strategies at equilibrium; (ii) there always exists a k-Veto system that is e¢ cient; and (iii) Veto is asymptotically optimal.
E¢ ciency Concepts
Utility. For a given mechanism M and a given pro…le , we can de…ne e 1 (M; ) and e 2 (M; ), the probability that decision R is taken in state ! Q , and the probability that decision Q is taken in state ! R , respectively. Therefore, they correspond to (ex-post) expected probabilities of errors of type I and II (from a common-value agent's perspective).
We have:
We are now in position to de…ne the ex-post, interim, and ex-ante utility of an agent i, under any mechanism M :
Dominance and E¢ ciency. We focus on Pareto dominance and e¢ ciency as formalized by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) .
And M interim strictly dominates M 0 if this condition also holds with strict inequality for some i and i .
Ex-ante and ex-post dominance are de…ned similarly and the de…nitions of e¢ ciency directly follow. Note that interim dominance implies ex-ante dominance, and that ex-ante e¢ ciency implies interim e¢ ciency.
Comparing Voting Systems. A voting system and an associated strategy pro…le form a mechanism that maps realized type pro…les into group decisions. We denote such a mechanism :
For what follows, let us adapt the de…nition of interim dominance and take into account potential equilibrium multiplicity. 
Veto Interim Dominates Unanimity
Theorem 1 Theorem 1. For all tuples Q ; R ; n; p , Veto interim (and thus ex-ante) dominates Unanimity; strictly unless Q ( R ) n 1 .
Theorem 1 is a powerful result: it implies that no agent (even after learning their type)
would object to getting rid of Unanimity and using Veto instead.
The intuition is as follows. First, when there is at least one private-value agent in the group, the status quo is kept under the two systems. Let us focus on the cases where there are only common-value agents and consider Q -and R -agents in turn. Under Unanimity, Q -agents play v with positive probability. Thus, their interim utility equals the utility of getting Q with probability 1. Since they can also play v under Veto (and get Q with probability 1), they cannot be worse o¤. By a simple revealed preference argument, they are strictly better o¤ in the cases where they strictly prefer to vote q (which is typical of the information aggregation equilibrium).
For R -agents, the intuition goes as follows: under Unanimity the reform R is rarely chosen. This implies that the probability of making a mistake is relatively high in state
Given that R -agents believe that state ! R is more likely than state ! Q ; their interim utility under Unanimity is low. Since Veto does not su¤er from the same weakness, Ragents are strictly better o¤ under Veto than under Unanimity.
One can also establish that the interim dominance of k-Veto over Unanimity implies the interim dominance of k 0 -Veto over Unanimity for k < k 0 n: To see the intuition behind this, pick an arbitrary vector of values for Q , R ; n; and p and denote k the quorum such that k -Veto is e¢ cient (see Theorem 2 below). If k 0 > k , the quorum is too high to aggregate information perfectly. However, under Unanimity, the corresponding quorum would be n, and information aggregation would be even worse. Now, consider k 0 < k .
In this case, the quorum is too low. But we know that Veto dominates when k = n+1 2 : Therefore, increasing the quorum (that is, bringing it closer to k ) can only improve information aggregation. One cannot conclude, however, that the strict dominance result applies for all parameter values for all quorums strictly below 
Is Veto E¢ cient?
We have established that Veto dominates Unanimity, but are there mechanisms that dominate Veto?
Given our research question, we restrict our attention to unanimous mechanism -i.e., mechanisms that allow any agent to enforce the status quo. In a voting set-up, this means that agents must have veto power. In a more general mechanism design approach, we capture this restriction by imposing that, under an admissible mechanism, the interim utility of all agents is at least as high as their utility under the status-quo.
This constraint (which we will refer to as the veto constraint) can be understood as an interim participation constraint, where agents'outside option is their utility under the status quo. The veto constraint can equally be interpreted as resulting from an ex-ante participation constraint in a version of the model in which some agents in some states would have a su¢ ciently large disutility from the reform. In this case, agents are only willing to participate ex ante if the mechanism ensures that they will be able to block any reform that would critically hurt their interest. 4 De…nition 6 De…nition 6. A mechanism is admissible if it satis…es:
where M Q is a trivial mechanism that keeps the status quo for all type pro…le: M Q ( ) = Q; 8 : We denote by M the set of such admissible mechanisms.
Since private-value agents dislike the reform irrespective of the state of nature, all admissible mechanisms must keep the status quo for any type pro…le including a privatevalue agent. This implies that a mechanism's relative performance (and its e¢ ciency) can be assessed on the basis of its outcome for type pro…les including only common-value agents.
Henceforth, we will only compare admissible mechanisms. For instance, when we state that a mechanism is e¢ cient, this must be understood as e¢ cient within the set of admissible mechanisms. When relevant, we also impose incentive compatibility (see Section 5.1). Given that k-Veto and Unanimity give veto power to each agent in the group (and that incentive compatibility constraints are, by de…nition, satis…ed in equilibrium), both voting systems at equilibrium are admissible mechanisms.
Lemma 3 Lemma 3. The following mechanism is ex-ante e¢ cient:
R if 8i; i 6 = P and Pr (! R j ) c i ;
Proof. First, note that M ( ) is admissible. Second, since there is no ex-post disagreement among common-value agents, it is ex-post e¢ cient. Third, there is no admissible mechanism that gives higher ex-post utility to any agent. Thus, it is incentive compatible and ex-ante e¢ cient.
De…nition 7 De…nition 7. Voting system is e¢ cient if there exists an equilibrium under such that
Proof. The only non-trivial case is when the type pro…le does not include private-value agents -i.e., i 6 = P ; 8i. Consider the information-aggregation equilibrium characterized in Proposi-
n 1 ], R -agents play r, and Q -agents play q; and R is chosen if and only if there are more r-votes than q-votes. However, given that
2 if and only if there are more R -agents than Q -agents. If Q ( R ) n 1 , R -agents play r; and Q -agents play v; R is thus implemented only if there is For a voting system to be e¢ cient, it is necessary that agents use pure strategies (otherwise one cannot have full information revelation). However, we know from Lemma 1 that adjusting the approval quorum k can induce agents to do so. This leads to the following theorem. 5 Theorem 2 Theorem 2. For each tuple Q ; R ; n; p , there exists a k-Veto voting system that is ex-ante e¢ cient.
n 1 ; we know from Lemma 1 that, under k-Veto, for each tuple Q ; R ; n; p ; there is a k such that the rule admits an equilibrium in which R -agents play r and Q -agents play q. This directly implies that, for such a k, k-Veto implements R if and only if there are no private-value agents and the number of s R is greater than or equal to k. Given Lemma 3, it remains to be proven that Pr (! R j ) 1 2 if and only if the number of s R signals is greater than or equal to k. But for R -agents to play r and Q -agents to play q in equilibrium, it must be the case that (i) for any such that the number of
, and (ii) for any such that the number of s R signals received is equal to k 1;
In practice, it would be useful to have a system that performs well for di¤erent sets of parameters. This is, for instance,the case for a decision body that presides over many di¤erent issues but cannot adapt its voting system to the question at hand. Unfortunately, there is no k-Veto voting system that is ex-ante e¢ cient for all values of the parameters.
However, as implied above, Veto's departure from e¢ ciency stems from the use of mixed strategies. Therefore, increasing the group's size reduces ine¢ ciency. As we show in the next section, it vanishes as n increases.
Asymptotic Results
In this subsection, we establish Veto's appealing asymptotic properties.
De…nition 8 De…nition 8. Mechanism M is asymptotically optimal if, with a probability that tends to 1 when n tends to 1; it selects:
The decision is optimal if, given the state of nature and the type pro…le, the reform is adopted if and only if it constitutes a Pareto improvement over the status quo. 6 Let p lim denote the limit probability of having at least one private-value agent in the group: 7
When p lim = 1, the optimal decision is always to keep the status quo. In that case, all admissible mechanisms are asymptotically optimal. When p lim < 1, information aggregation remains relevant in the limit. It turns out that Veto is asymptotically optimal in this case as well.
Proposition 3 Proposition 3. For all Q , R ; and p, Veto is asymptotically optimal.
Proof. First, given that v ( P ) = 1; we have that 8 such that i = P for some i; Veto keeps the status quo Q; which is optimal. Second, it is easy to see that in the information-aggregation equilibrium of Section 3, for any R and Q ; in the limit, v ( ) = 0 8 2 f R ; Q g. Therefore,
if i 6 = P 8i; the outcome under Veto is exactly the same as under simple majority rule when
We know from Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) that, when p = 0; simple majority rule aggregates information perfectly in the limit -i.e., the group chooses R in state ! R and Q in state ! Q with a probability that tends to 1 when n ! 1:
8
In the case where p lim < 1, Unanimity is not asymptotically optimal when it is interim strictly dominated by Veto.
Discussion and Extensions
In this section, we …rst extend our analysis to a version of the model that allows for disagreement among common-value agents. Then we explore the consequences of relaxing the veto constraint.
Preference Diversity
To introduce disagreement among common-value agents, we allow c i to di¤er across them.
However, to avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that the probability of receiving the correct signal is the same in both states; i.e., Pr(s Q j! Q ) = Pr (s R j! R ) = > 1 2 :
7 The limit exists, since n i=1 (1 pi) monotonically decreases with n and is bounded below by zero. 8 Although our setup is slightly di¤erent than that of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) , the proof is almost identical.
We adopt a two-fold strategy to overcome the technical challenges heterogeneous c i 's implies. First, we focus on a case with three agents and two levels of cautiousness. In this case, the model is still analytically tractable: we are able to fully characterize equilibria and, for some values of the parameters establish the welfare results analytically. We use numerical methods otherwise.
Second, we study the asymptotic properties of Veto. This is the standard approach for analyzing models with rich preference structure, signal space, and/or state space. We show that Veto is still asymptotically optimal (and thus interim strictly dominates Unanimity when n is su¢ ciently large).
Three Agents
There are three common-value agents that may di¤er in their level of cautiousness. 9 Agents can be neutral, in which case they have the same cautiousness parameter as before (c N = Under Veto, there is an equilibrium such that: cautious agents vote q if they receive a signal s R , and they veto if they receive a signal s Q ; neutral agents vote r if they receive a signal s R , and they vote q if they receive a signal s Q . Under Unanimity, if c H is high enough, cautious agents veto irrespective of their signal. Neutral agents vote r if they receive a signal s R , and they mix between r and v with a signal s Q .
Why does Veto interim dominate Unanimity? First, if there are only neutral agents, Veto aggregates information perfectly (which leads to the right decision from their common viewpoint), but Unanimity does not. Second, if there is at least one cautious agent: (i) under Unanimity, the status quo always remains; (ii) under Veto, the status quo remains 9 We do not include private-value agents because this would not a¤ect the results.
in the case where all agents receive an s R signal and at most one of them is cautious. But when that is the case, R is the only ex-post e¢ cient, and therefore "right,"decision. Thus, Veto strictly interim dominates Unanimity. (1 ) 3 ; it is a weakly dominant strategy for cautious agents to veto the reform irrespective of their signal. Thus, they behave like private-value agents.
The interim dominance result of Theorem 1 therefore readily extends.
For other parameter values, tractability is an issue. We use the following numerical approach. First, we generate a grid for c H 2 E¢ ciency. When common-value agents may disagree ex-post, incentive compatibility constraints must be taken into account. For each point of the parameter grid, we consider all pure mechanisms -that is, all possible mappings from type pro…les into pure decisions (M : n ! fR; Qg). For each of these mechanisms, we compute interim utility u i (M j i ) under truthful revelation and discard those that are not admissible or incentive compatible.
Our e¢ ciency benchmark M IC is the mechanism that maximizes ex-ante utility among the remaining candidates. 
Large Groups
To explore the asymptotic properties of Veto (and Unanimity) and allow for private-value agents, we adapt the setup of Gerardi (2000) 
The main advantage of considering a setup (almost) identical to that of Gerardi (2000) is that we can use his results about non-unanimous rules in our proof of the following result:
Proposition 4 Proposition 4. For all Q , R ; and p; Veto is asymptotically optimal.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
As in the baseline model, Veto gives private-value agents the power to enforce the status quo without a¤ecting the behavior of common-value agents. The crux of the matter is to understand why the most cautious common-value agents (i.e., those with a large c i ) do not want to use their veto power.
When other common-value agents play the equilibrium strategy under majority rule, the expected outcome is R in state ! R and Q in state ! Q . Therefore, by vetoing the reform, a common-value agent is more likely to prevent a desirable reform than an undesirable one. As the size of the group grows larger, the relative likelihood of a mistake tends to in…nity, whence no common-value agent wants to veto the reform. 1 1 In Gerardi (2000) , c = 1. In our context, this case is somehow extreme (and unnecessarily complicates the analysis because of an order-of-limits issue). When c = 1, there may be distribution functions such that the probability of having an agent who behaves as a private-value agent (because she has very high cautiouness) tends to 1 when n tends to 1. In these particular cases, Veto and Unanimity would then both be asymptotically optimal.
In our setup, we can show that an asymptotically optimal mechanism interim strictly dominates any mechanism that is not asymptotically optimal. Based on this, we get the following result:
Proposition 5 Proposition 5. For all Q , R ; and p; for n su¢ ciently large, Veto interim dominates Unanimity.
Non-unanimous Decision-making
Our analysis focuses on information aggregation when there is a veto constraint. In many of the applications we have in mind, this constraint emerges from the need to protect single individuals (or states). Thus, the veto constraint can be interpreted as an extreme need for minority protection. But what if the minority in question is larger than 1?
Minority Larger than One. Consider a group of n agents whose objective is to implement the reform if and only if two conditions are satis…ed: (i) it is against the private interests of no more than f agents, and (ii) the reform is good (from the common-value agent standpoint). Which voting system should they use?
Veto achieves this objective for f = 0: We conjecture that the following simple rules would achieve this objective for f > 0 (this is because, similarly to k-Veto, they make it easier for agents to dissociate the minority protection dimension from the information aggregation dimension). Under these rules, the action set is the same as under Veto (i.e., fr; q; vg), and the aggregation rule is:
That is, the reform is adopted if and only if no more than f agents vote v and a majority vote r. Here, v is a strong action against the reform, but it is no longer a veto.
If these rules indeed show similar properties to Veto, this would provide an argument for the so-called …libuster procedure, which exists in many parliamentary systems, as a way to balance minority protection and information aggregation. 12 1 2 We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension, and its application to the Veto vs. Majority Rules. Now imagine that there is no minority to protect. For instance, consider a pure common-value set-up (i.e., p = 0). Can we say something of the comparison of Veto and majority rule? The answer is yes: Veto ex-ante dominates majority rule (strictly when v is played with positive probability in the Information Aggregation Equilibrium under Veto). 13 To understand why Veto dominates majority rule, …rst note that any strategy pro…le under majority rule can be reproduced under Veto. Second, recall from McLennan (1998) that in a pure common-value environment, a strategy pro…le producing the maximal ex-ante utility must be an equilibrium. Therefore, there always exists an equilibrium under Veto that produces an ex-ante utility at least as high as in the unique equilibrium under majority rule. However, Veto has a larger action set, which proves useful in cases where the negative signal is precise enough. These are the cases where Veto strictly dominates majority rule.
Empirical Relevance and Applications
In this section, we discuss the empirical relevance of our analysis. First, we argue that international organizations often combine an information aggregation problem in a commonvalue environment with a veto constraint, and factors that limit timely and truthful communication. 14 To argue this point, we discuss the United Nations Security Council. It is particularly relevant because it suggests that using Veto instead of Unanimity does indeed improve outcome e¢ ciency. We then extend the argument to international organizations in general.
Second, we discuss our results in the context of a vast literature that views trials by jury as an information aggregation problem where the voting system plays a crucial role.
One of the main policy debates focuses on whether to use Unanimity or some form of majority rule. We argue that our results may bring the two sides of this debate closer …libuster procedure. 1 3 See Proposition 10 in the Online Appendix. This is related to the result of Duggan and Martinelli (2001) that unanimity rule can dominate non-unanimous rules for some structures of information. 1 4 In our model, when ci's are identical, if pre-vote communication is allowed and costless, there exist e¢ cient equilibria in which voters truthfully reveal their types in the communication stage and vote for the optimal group decision in the voting stage (this is a trivial extension of Proposition 8 in Coughlan (2001) , in which we allow agents to communicate their type). In that case, we can simply think of kVeto as a method of formalizing information aggregation that might otherwise be accomplished through communication.
together.
International Organizations
The Charter of the UN is explicit about the common-value dimension: it proclaims that the peoples of the United Nations resolve to combine their e¤orts to accomplish common aims (international peace, economic and social advancement of all people, etc.). It grounds these aims in the ideals of justice and fundamental human rights.
The Charter also states that the Security Council shall make decisions based on an a¢ rmative vote of nine members which must include the concurring votes of the permanent members. This, in e¤ect, gives veto power to each permanent member. However, as noted on the UN website, "If a permanent member does not fully agree with a proposed resolution but does not wish to cast a veto, it may choose to abstain, thus allowing the resolution to be adopted if it obtains the required number of nine favorable votes."With the exception that only …ve countries have veto power, this corresponds to a k-Veto rule, with an approval quorum (k) of nine out of …fteen members. Indeed, the ten elected members can vote yes, no, or abstain. The …ve permanent members can vote yes, veto, or abstain. In both cases, abstention counts as a no. Even if members share common aims, they may still have vested interests and/or di¤erent views about how to best achieve these aims. In such a context, it seems hardly plausible that full, truthful, and timely communication is always possible and incentive compatible. The best way to illustrate this is perhaps with an example. In March 1994, in the run-up to the Rwandan genocide, a number of key actors were aware of alarming pieces of intelligence (e.g., the mass training of militias, the establishment of weapon caches, and the registration of ethnic Tutsis in the capital, Kigali). Subsequent evidence shows that this intelligence was not shared with the Security Council at the time key decisions were made. 15 The voting rule used by the Security Council has evolved with time, and practice, in the direction predicted by our results. Article 27 (3) possible for a permanent member to express its reservations about a particular decision while not obstructing it." 16 That such a possibility enhances information aggregation is 1 5 See the report from the National Assembly of France (http://www.assembleenationale.fr/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp) and the declassi…ed documents from the National Security Archive (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw01.pdf). 1 6 The Council of the European Union o¤ers a parallel. Indeed, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) introduced a key novelty for matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): instead of Unanimity, the voting procedure became unanimity rule under the constructive abstention regime. In that case, if more than a third of the Member States (or Member States representing more than a third of the EU population) abstain "constructively," the proposal is rejected. This rule formally corresponds to k-Veto, with a quorum of 2/3 of the votes. the key mechanism behind our results.
Permanent members have repeatedly made use of the option to abstain. As a result, resolutions are frequently adopted without the explicit support of all …ve permanent members. 17 The most striking example might be Resolution 344: "On 15 December 1973, Resolution 344 was carried by the votes of the non-permanent members, with all …ve permanent members abstaining" (Felsenthal and Machover 2000, p. 11). 18 Consistent with our analysis, some observers of the UN seem to agree that interpreting a voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not tantamount to a veto did improve decision making in the Security Council. As a matter of fact, the early reasons for, and discussion of, abstaining put forth by the permanent members can be illuminating. For instance, in 1947, the UK Representative justi…ed his abstention on Resolution 27 as follows: "The UK has abstained; but in view of the fact that everybody here clearly wishes this war to stop, the UK does not wish its abstention to be treated as a veto invalidating the resolution which has otherwise secured the necessary majority" (cited in Gross 1951, p. 216).
The argument easily generalizes beyond the UN Security Council. First, the principle of national sovereignty is a pillar of international law. It implies that international organizations are limited in terms of the measures that they can e¤ectively impose on member states. In practice, this imposes a constraint on which decision rules that they can use 1 7 As tallied by Felsenthal and Machover (2000, p.
11): "In the period 1946-97, this happened in the case of 300 resolutions-well over 28% of the total 1068 resolutions adopted by the UNSC". Between 1998 and 2015, we counted 52 additional occurences (voting records are available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/). 
Trials by Jury
There is a vast literature that views trials by jury as an information aggregation problem where the voting system plays a crucial role. The debate focuses on whether verdicts should be unanimous. The typical argument for the need of unanimous verdicts is that "It is a widely held belief among legal theorists that the requirement of unanimous jury not been used successfully by proponents of non-unanimous verdicts. 20 Our results suggest a new angle in this debate because k-Veto rules combine the strengths of both Unanimity and majority rules: they foster information aggregation while still granting every juror the power to prevent a conviction.
Conclusion
In our view, in addition to their strong theoretical properties, the simplicity of k-Veto Any call for reform should, however, be supported by strong empirical evidence. Our companion paper, , is a …rst step in that direction. We compare Veto and Unanimity through a series of controlled laboratory experiments. By and large, we …nd strong support for the dominance of Veto over Unanimity.
Appendices Appendix A1: Equilibrium Analysis under Veto
Proposition 1 greatly simpli…es the characterization of any equilibrium under Veto since it allows us to focus on the pure common-value game in which p = 0.
We organize the equilibrium analysis as follows: …rst, we de…ne the pivotal events, compute their probabilities, and derive the possible actions'expected payo¤s. Second, we characterize the set of equilibria. Finally, we argue that only one equilibrium is relevant.
In the common-value game, there are n common-value agents, i.e. i 2 f Q ; R g 8i. We will often refer to Q and R as signals instead of types.
Agents' behavior depend on pivotal events: situations in which their vote changes the …nal outcome towards a speci…c group decision. In other words, an agent is pivotal if the group decision would be di¤erent without her vote. Whether a vote is pivotal therefore depends on the decision rule and on all other agents'behavior. Agents'behavior, in turn, depends on their strategies and on the signal they receive. Thus, for any strategy pro…le, it is possible to compute the probability of each pivotal event.
At this point, it is useful to introduce two new objects. First, x a denotes, from the perspective of a given agent, the number of other agents playing action a: Second, ! a ( ) denotes the statecontingent probability that an agent votes a in state ! for a given strategy pro…le . It is de…ned as follows:
where Pr ( R j!) = Pr (s R j!) and Pr ( Q j!) = Pr (s Q j!) 8! since p = 0:
Pivot Probabilities and Payo¤s
Under Veto, there are two pivotal events. First, a r-vote is pivotal when, without that vote, R is lacking just one vote to be adopted (i.e. x r = n 1 2 ) and nobody cast a v-vote. We denote that pivotal event in state ! by piv ! R : Second, a v-vote is pivotal when the number of r-votes among other agents is larger or equal to the quorum 2 ) and nobody else casts a v-vote. We denote that pivotal event in state ! by piv ! Q : Importantly, a q-ballot is never pivotal under Veto. Indeed, this would require that, without that vote, R wins (i.e. x r n+1 2 ), and, with that vote, Q wins (i.e. X r < n+1 2 ); an impossibility. For the sake of readability, our notation does not re ‡ect the fact that the probability of pivotal events depend on the strategies through the expected vote shares, i.e. we henceforth omit from the notation.
For piv ! R ; we have Pr(piv
Similarly, for piv ! Q we have:
Using these pivot probabilities, we can compute the expected payo¤ of the di¤erent actions for a common-value agent of type 2 f Q ; R g. To do this, it is useful to de…ne common-value agents'interim beliefs about the state of nature:
; and
Therefore, we have that the expected payo¤ of an r-vote for a common-value agent who received signal is
the expected payo¤ of a v-vote for a common-value agent who received signal is
and the expected payo¤ of a q-vote for a common-value agent who received signal is
The Information-Aggregation Equilibrium
To organize the discussion of the equilibrium behavior of common-value agents under Veto, it is useful to partition the parameter space. This is because equilibrium strategies are non-trivially a¤ected by the relative precision of the signals. We denote the precision of a signal Q by Q
. 21 For any n and R , we have identi…ed four thresholds 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 for Q ; at which the set of actions played with strictly positive probability in equilibrium changes. Next proposition characterizes these thresholds and the equilibrium associated with it.
Proposition 6 Proposition 6 (Information-Aggregation Equilibrium). For each tuple
R ; Q ; n ; there exist unique thresholds 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 (with 1 < 1 < 2 3 4 < 1) such that the following strategy pro…le is a responsive symmetric equilibrium under Veto:
where , , and, are unique; and satisfy the following properties ensures that, in such a case, the posterior beliefs of the agent under consideration are in line with her signal. In other words, conditional on an r-ballot being pivotal, R -agents believe that R is best and Q -agents believe that Q is best. The implication in terms of voting behavior is obvious for R -agents: they vote for r. For Q -agents, the situation is slightly more complicated since there are two options to vote against R: voting either q or v. A q-ballot has an expected payo¤ of zero, whereas a v-ballot has a negative expected payo¤. This is so because a v-ballot changes the outcome when there are n+1 2 or more r votes. Given the strategy under consideration and the relative precision of the signals, this is more likely to happen in state ! R than in state ! Q :
When Q 2 [1; 1 ) ; signal R is more precise than signal Q : In that case, Q -agents prefer to overlook their signal and vote r with positive probability. Doing so, they "compensate"for the bias in the information structure. The reason is that, because the signal is imprecise, the probability of making a mistake in state ! R is too high. This is exactly the same behavior as under majority rule.
The case with Q 2 ( 2 ; 3 ] resembles the one with Q 2 [1; 1 ), but the di¤erence in signal precision is in favor of Q : As a result of the di¤erence in signal precision, R -agents prefer to overlook their signal and vote against R with positive probability. Again, this is similar as under majority rule. Yet, under Veto agents have two ways to vote against R: voting q or v: The appeal of v depends positively on the precision of the Q signal, and negatively on the relative probability of being pivotal in favor of Q in states ! R and ! Q : Therefore, 3 requires that, for a given precision of the Q signal, the expected lead of R in state ! R is large enough and/or the lead of Q in state
When Q 2 ( 3 ; 4 ) ; the situation resembles the situation for Q 2 ( 2 ; 3 ] : The di¤erence is that Q -agents want to use their veto power with positive probability. As just explained, this is so because, for the strategy pro…le when Q 2 ( 2 ; 3 ], the expected lead of R in state ! R is too large in comparison to the expected lead of Q in state ! Q . In equilibrium, (1) R -agents mix between r and q; but they vote r with higher probability than for Q 3 , and (2) Q -agents mix between q and v. The intuition comes in two steps. First, the positive probability of a veto by Q -agents makes a vote r more appealing (i.e. Pr(piv 
, common-value agents behave as they would under Unanimity. The Q signal is so precise (relatively) that one Q signal is su¢ cient information to conclude that Q is better than R (even if all other signals are R signals). Therefore, Q -agents prefer to cast a v-vote.
For R -agents, the situation is di¤erent. Given the strategy under consideration, conditional on being pivotal, all other agents must have received a R -signal. Obviously, if there are only R signals, any agent must believe that state ! R is more likely than state ! Q : She thus prefers to cast a r-vote.
The Unanimity-like Equilibrium
We show here that, when Q < 4 , there exists another symmetric responsive equilibrium which corresponds to the unique equilibrium under Unanimity (in the next subsection, we show that this is the only other equilibrium). However, such an equilibrium is not robust under Veto (see discussion below). We therefore see it as of little relevance. Proposition 7 Proposition 7 (Unanimity-Like Equilibrium). If Q < 4 , the following strategy pro…le is a responsive symmetric equilibrium under Veto:
This equilibrium corresponds to the unique equilibrium under Unanimity.
Proof. Straightforward extension of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) . See Appendix A2 for detail.
Under Unanimity, Q -agents realize they can only be pivotal if all other agents vote r. Given that this is more likely to happen in state ! R (because R -agents always play r), Q -agents only play v with probability 1 if signal s Q is su¢ ciently precise ( Q 4 ). In all other cases, they play r with positive probability, which results in a relatively high probability of errors of both types (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998).
To understand why it is also an equilibrium under Veto, remember that we can rede…ne Unanimity using the same decision rule as under Veto. Then, Unanimity corresponds to Veto with a smaller action set. That is, action q is not available under Unanimity. Under Veto, when no other agent ever votes q, a q-vote is strategically equivalent to an r-vote (since the approval quorum is satis…ed with probability 1, the reform will be adopted unless someone vetoes it). 22 So, the equilibrium under Unanimity must be an equilibrium under Veto.
However, we see several reasons to question the robustness of such an equilibrium under Veto.
First, as we show in the welfare analysis, it is Pareto Dominated by the information-aggregation equilibrium.
Second, it is instable in the following sense. Imagine that Q -agents tremble and play q with very small but strictly positive probability (in equilibrium, they are indi¤erent between the three possible actions), while R -agents still play r with probability 1. Then, a best response for Qagents cannot involve playing both r and v with strictly positive probability, i.e. it cannot be "close" to the equilibrium strategy pro…le. In fact, as tends to 0, the equilibrium of such a perturbed game tends to the information-aggregation equilibrium. The intuition is the following:
in the unanimity-like equilibrium, agents are indi¤erent between q and r because one can never be pivotal in favor of R (if no other agent has vetoed, then it must be that everyone else played r, and there already is a majority in favor of the reform). But, if q is played with positive probability, even very small, it becomes possible that x r = n 1 2 . Since this is more likely to happen in state Q than in state R, a Q -agent then strictly prefers to vote q than r. Note that if Q -agents do not play r, this decreases the gain for them to play v, and the equilibrium unravels. 23 Finally, we present in a companion paper the results of an experimental study that strongly supports the prediction that agents will coordinate on the information-aggregation equilibrium rather than the unanimity-like equilibrium (see .
No Other Equilibria
We show that there cannot be other responsive symmetric equilibria than those described in Propositions 6 and 7. The proof is rather straightforward, but quite tedious, so we organize it with the matrix in Figure 2 that considers all the possible classes of (symmetric) strategy pro…les. Possible classes of strategy for an agent are given by: fr; rq; q; qv; v; qrv; rvg, where for instance rq means that this agent plays r and q (but not v) with strictly positive probability.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
We show in …ve steps that the only possible equilibria correspond to the information-aggregation equilibrium (cells "IAE") and the unanimity-like one (cells "ULE").
First, note that if agent Q play r with positive probability at equilibrium, it must be the case that agent R plays r with probability 1. This is just because signals are informative. Formally, from equations (3), (4), and (5), we have:
and
Similarly, if agent R plays v with positive probability, then agent Q plays v with probability 1.
These two restrictions rule out the cases corresponding to the shaded cells with reference "x".
Second, we can rule out a series of remaining cases where the strategy pro…le is not responsive.
These are the cells in dark grey.
Third, from the characterization of the information-aggregation equilibrium, we have that: (i) if agents Q play v with probability 1, then agents R can only be pivotal if all agents receive a signal R . In which case they strictly prefer to play r. We can therefore rule out another set of pro…les. The corresponding cells are shaded and labelled "Prop 6".
Fourth, from equation (5); it is easy to show that, if agents Q play qv or qrv, then R -agents play r with probability 1 only if Q 2 : But then, we have that G (vj Q ) < 0; a contradiction.
We can therefore rule out these pro…les as well. The corresponding cells are shaded and labelled "no veto".
Finally, the remaining cells correspond to the two equilibria we have characterized. And we have shown that they are both unique within their strategy pro…le class.
Appendix A2: Equilibrium Analysis under Unanimity
In this appendix, we characterize the unique responsive equilibrium under Unanimity. Doing so, we extend the equilibrium characterization in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) to biased information structure and the possible presence of a private-value agent.
As under Veto, P -agents strictly prefers to play v, i.e. ii) is an equilibrium of the corresponding game with p = 0:
Proof. Identical to that of Proposition 1.
As for Veto, this Proposition greatly simpli…es the equilibrium analyzing by allowing us to focus on the pure common-value game in which p = 0: This is exactly what we do in the remainder of this Appendix.
Pivot Probabilities and Expected Payo¤s
Under Unanimity, a vote for r is pivotal if and only if, without that vote, the group decision is Q but, with that vote, it becomes R. This happens when no other agent is casting a v-vote (i.e.
x v = 0). In this case, we say that the vote is pivotal in favor of R: We denote this event in state ! by piv !;U R : The probability of that event depends on expected vote shares, which in turn depends on the state of the world and agent strategies. We denote Pr(piv !;U R ) the probability to be pivotal in favor of R in state ! under Unanimity. Formally:
A vote for v cannot be pivotal. Indeed, there is no combination of other agents'vote such that the decision is R without this vote and becomes Q with it. In fact, either x v > 0 and the "current" outcome, Q, can no longer be changed, or x v = 0, which implies x r = n 1 < n, and the "current" outcome is Q. Remember that q is not an available action under U .
The expected payo¤ of actions r for an agent of type 2 f R ; Q g under Unanimity is
and the expected payo¤ of actions v for an agent with signal 2 f R ; Q g under Unanimity is
The Unique Equilibrium
The following proposition extends the equilibrium characterization in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) to possibly biased information structures and the possible presence of private-value agents.
Proposition 9 Proposition 9. The following strategy pro…le is the unique responsive symmetric equilibrium under Unanimity:
The intuition is easier to grasp by …rst explaining why and when R -agents voting r and Qagents voting v is not an equilibrium (i.e. Q < 4 ). Consider an agent who receives signal Q .
She believes, but is not sure, that Q is a better decision than R. When deciding which vote to cast, she only focuses on situations in which her vote is pivotal. Under Unanimity, this only happens when all other agents vote for r (event piv !;U R ). If R -agents vote r and Q -agents vote v, this happens if all other agents have received a signal R , which is more likely to happen in state ! R than in state ! Q : As long as the precision of the Q signal is not too high (i.e. Q < 4 ), the joint event (n 1 R -signals and 1 Q -signal) is also more likely in state ! R than in state ! Q . She is thus better overlooking her signal and voting for r. Therefore, R -agents voting r and Q -agents voting v cannot be an equilibrium in this case.
To understand why the equilibrium is in mixed strategies when Q < 4 , notice that when Q -agents mix between r and v; the information content conditional on being pivotal decreases (since Q -agents also vote r with positive probability, the fact of being pivotal no longer hinges on all other agents having received R -signals; hence, the posterior probability of being in state ! R when being pivotal decreases). For U r ( Q ) large enough, this information content is too low to convince Q -agents to overlook their signal. The equilibrium corresponds to the case where the posterior probability of being in either state is equal, which makes agents indi¤erent between the two actions.
For Q 4 , the precision of the Q -signal is so high that a Q -agent remains convinced that state ! Q is more likely when all other agents received a R -signal. In other words, a single Q -signal would su¢ ce to convince an agent that could observe the n signals and could decide for the group to choose decision Q. Therefore, R -agents voting r and Q -agents voting v is an equilibrium. Note that there always is an n su¢ ciently large such that this case does not arise.
Appendix A3: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Given Proposition 1, we can focus on p = 0:
First, note that v is a weakly dominant strategy for Q -agents when Q > ( R ) n 1 : The proof that R -agents play r under k-Veto is similar to step (v) of Proposition 6 (the Proposition is in Appendix A1 and the proof in the Online Appendix).
Second, we prove that, for each tuple Q ; R ; n; p , R -agents playing r and Q -agents playing
To do so, we …rst need to de…ne the gains to vote r or v for each common-value agent type under k-Veto when R -agents play r and Q -agents play q:
For r ( R ) = 1, and q ( Q ) = 1 to be an equilibrium, we need (a) Consider condition (a). In this case, G k (rj R ) 0 boils down to
which is satis…ed i¤ Q ( R ) k n k , which holds by assumption.
Consider condition (c). In this case, G k (rj Q ) 0 boils down to
which is satis…ed i¤ ( R ) k 1 n+1 k Q , which holds by assumption. Consider condition (d). Following an identical approach as in the proof of Proposition 6 (for the equivalent condition step), we obtain a term-by-term su¢ cient condition for G k (vj Q ) 0:
From Q ( R ) k n k ; R > 1; and j n j k n k 8j 2 fk; :::; n 1g; we have that this is satis…ed.
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove the theorem, we show that all agents are weakly better o¤ under Veto at the information-aggregation equilibrium (we denote the corresponding mechanism by V IA ) than at the unique equilibrium under Unanimity (U U ) and that, unless i = P or Q 4 , some agents are strictly better o¤.
In these cases, all agents are equally well o¤ ex post and, therefore, at the interim stage. Now consider i 6 = P 8i and Q < 4 . The game is equivalent to the pure common-value game (i.e. p = 0). We show that
holds for all R ; Q ; and n, and for all possible realizations of , at least weakly for Q -agents, and striclty for R -agents.
Step 1: Q -agents Under Unanimity, the strategy of a Q -agent is U r ( Q ) = , and U v ( Q ) = 1 (Proposition 9 in Appendix A2). As she is indi¤erent between playing r and v, her interim utility is the same in both cases. If she plays v, then the decision is Q for sure, and her expected utility is minus the probability to be in state ! R conditional on being type Q , that is:
Under Veto, at the information aggregation equilibrium (Proposition 6 in Appendix A1), Qagents either choose not to veto, or they are indi¤erent between vetoing and voting q. They cannot be strictly worse o¤ under V IA than U U by a simple revealed preference argument: these agents could always ensure a level of expected utility equal to 1 1+ Q by vetoing. Note that we can in fact show that they are strictly better o¤ under V IA than U U when they choose not to (but this is not needed for Theorem 1).
Step 2: R -agents when Q 2 [ 1 ; 2 ]:
In this case, under both mechanisms, R -agents always play r. Their interim utility is (for any Q ):
For condition (9) to hold strictly, we need:
From Propositions 6 and 9, this becomes:
We can then rewrite the LHS as
We can also distribute the RHS, and group it similarly as the LHS:
We therefore need to show:
We can now compare these two sums term by term (recall that here Q 2 [ 1 ; 2 ]) and show that the LHS terms are always larger that the RHS terms. First, observe that the terms in j = n 1 cancel out. Second, for j 2 [ 2 . So, all the respective terms on the RHS are negative and they are equal to 0 in the LHS.
Step 3: R -agents when Q 2 ( 2 ; 3 ]:
In this case, under U U , R -agents still always play r. Hence, their interim utility is still given by (10) : But we have This can be rewritten as follows:
By the de…nition of " , it is easy to show that the term in j = n 1 2 is nil (it exactly corresponds to the agent's gain of playing r, which is nil in this equilibrium) and that the terms in j < n 1 2 are strictly negative. Therefore, we have that:
Using the Binomial Theorem this corresponds to:
Now, from Proposition 9, we have:
Thus, for u i (V IA j R ) > u i (U U j R ) to hold, it is su¢ cient that:
To prove that this is always satis…ed, we show that the derivative of the RHS with respect to is positive:
(n 1)( R 1)
To see this, we use that G U (vj Q ) = 0 in equilibrium requires (see the proof of Proposition 6 in the Online Appendix):
Then, this condition boils down to
which is always strictly satis…ed when Q < 4 :
Step 4: R -agents when Q 2 ( 3 ; 4 ).
To show that V IA ex-ante strictly dominates U U , we construct a (non-equilibrium) strategy pro…le 0 such that V 0 ex-ante dominates V U . That is:
By McLennan, 1998, which shows that the strategy that maximizes ex-ante welfare in a commonvalue game must be an equilibrium, we know that there must be another equilibrium under Veto that ex ante strictly dominates U : Since there are only two equilibria under Veto, this dominating equilibrium must be IA : Since V U is equivalent to U U ; i.e. V U ( ) = U U ( ) for all ; we have where correspond to that of Proposition 7.
R -agents are strictly better of if
And it is obvious that the condition holds strictly since we have that ( R ) Q -agents are better o¤ if
And it is obvious that the condition holds since we have that: ( R ) j Q n j for all j n 1 2
Hence,
, which is what we need.
Step 5: R -agents when Q 2 (1; 1 ):
First we use and (from Propositions 6 and 9) to derive the probabilities that the reform is adopted (conditional on the agent being R ) in each state under both rules (remember that 
:
Note that they are all independent from R :
The interim utility of a R -agent is given by (10) and (11)under U U and V IA , respectively. Therefore, u i (V IA j R ) u i (U U j R ) is given by
From step 2, we know that u i (V IA j R ) > u i (U U j R ) when Q = 1 . To prove that this inequality holds for any Q 2 (1; R ) ; it is su¢ cient to prove that it is satis…ed for any R larger than the R such that Q = 1 : Given that (!) is independent of R for all and !; a su¢ cient condition for u i (V IA j R ) > u i (U U j R ) to be satis…ed for larger R is that V (! R ) U (! R ).
Thus, we need to prove that the following inequality is satis…ed when Q 2 (1; 1 ):
This boils down to Given that the terms in j = n 1 = k cancel out, we can focus on j < n 1 and k < n 1. Note that, for all j < n 1 Proof. See Online Appendix.
